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Legislature Mulls Change of Article 8; Corporate Law 
 
By Francis J. Facciolo 
Corporate Law 
A major revision of Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code was passed by the New York 
Assembly on July 2, 1996, but did not receive Senate consideration prior to adjustment.  In light 
of the strong support given Proposed Article 8 by the banking and securities industries, the New 
York State Legislature will probably give serious consideration to passage when the next 
legislative session begins. 
Although the supporters of Proposed Article 8 have stoutly maintained that it is primarily a 
clarification of the existing Article 8 and that the proposed changes are insignificant, the proposal 
actually includes major changes that should be of concern to all investors in America’s securities 
markets.  Without significant amendments to Proposed Article 8, investors would be profoundly 
disadvantaged. 
Separate Regimes 
The separate legal regimes created by Proposed Article 8 for securities held directly and indirectly 
were described by Richard Smith and Paul Schupak in an article published in the New York Law 
Journal on May 30, 1996.  The creation of separate regimes, as explicated by Smith and Schupak, 
is the single largest change wrought by Proposed Article 8, and one with which the author has no 
general quarrel. 
Proposed Article 8 has added Part 5 to deal with indirectly held securities.  Part 5 is based upon 
the newly created concept of a securities entitlement, which is not an interest in any particular 
security.  Rather, it is the rights and property interest of an entitlement holder with respect to a 
financial asset specified in Part 5. 
In contrast to the common law concepts underlying New York Article 8 that are based on claims 
to specific physical certificates, Proposed Article 8 has created a new type of property interest that 
is not a claim to a specific identifiable thing; [rather] it is a package of rights and interests that a 
person has against the person’s securities intermediary and the property held by the intermediary. 
The intent of Proposed Article 8 is to restrict entitlement holders in most situations to a cause of 
action against the securities intermediary.  This creates high barriers to the assertion by an 
entitlement holder of property rights in any financial asset against a purchaser of the financial 
asset. 
Proposed Article 8 does little to explain why it should be adopted.  The prefatory note to Proposed 
Article 8 briefly mentions the legal uncertainties created by the prior version of Article 8 and the 
adverse effects these uncertainties have on all participants in securities trading. 
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Professor James Steven Rogers, the reporter for Proposed Article 8, has provided a much fuller 
rationale in a recent article in UCLA Law Review.  He has identified concerns with systemic risk 
in the financial markets as the impetus behind Proposed Article 8.  Systemic risk is [t]he risk that 
inability of one [financial] institution to meet its obligations [to pay funds or transfer securities] 
when due will cause other [financial] institutions to be unable to meet their obligations when due. 
Systemic risk can arise from any cause that would lead financial institutions to fail, thus possibly 
triggering a domino effect.  The particular systemic risks to which Proposed Article 8 is addressed 
are those arising from clearance and settlement of securities trades.  Professor Rogers has justified 
Proposed Article 8 as one part of a world-wide effort to assure that the clearance and settlement 
system for securities trading functions in such a way that the system does not create systemic risk. 
Professor Rogers starts his defense of Proposed Article 8 with an 11-page discussion of systemic 
risk.  Nowhere in these 11 pages or in the balance of his article does he ever explain what aspects 
of systemic risk would be alleviated by Proposed Article 8.  Nor does he give any convincing 
examples of systemic risk that have arisen from the prior versions of Article 8. 
In fact, Professor Rogers himself reports that although there were many general expressions to the 
effect that prior law did not provide a sufficiently certain legal framework for transactions 
implemented through the modern securities holding system, there was relatively little specific 
description of problems. 
The problem with this systemic risk argument as applied to Proposed Article 8 is the one that 
Professor Rogers’ article exemplifies.  No one has identified exactly how Proposed Article 8 
alleviates systemic risk. 
Professor Paul Shupack, the chair of the Working Group of the Uniform State Laws Committee of 
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York who authored a very influential report in favor 
of Proposed Article 8 (the Article 8 Bar Report), is even more blunt than Professor Rogers:  The 
conclusion that current law creates serious risk of systemic market failure is the SEC’s, not mine.  
I have no basis independent of the SEC studies upon which to form a judgment about the empirical 
claim that drastic reform of prior Article 8 is needed. 
Not all writers on financial matters agree that the current system, if not reformed, engenders 
significant systemic risks.  Even if one takes the many systemic risk studies cited by Professor 
Rogers and the other related studies at their word, and assumes that there are significant risks 
contained within the clearance and settlement systems for securities, the net result of making this 
assumption is to demonstrate the irrelevance in most respects of Proposed Article 8 to the concerns 
of these studies. 
The essential concern of the many studies of systemic risk has been the gap in time between 
transfer of a security and payment for it.  This gap exposes securities industry participants, and 
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through them the banks that provide financing to the participants, to serious credit and liquidity 
risks.  But these risks are not ones arising from flaws in New York Article 8. 
The supporters of Proposed Article 8 maintain that it furthers a policy of finality in securities 
transactions, i.e., only in the most unusual circumstances should a third party be able to challenge 
a securities transfer.  And it is true that the systemic risk studies also identify finality as a policy to 
be favored.  But finality concerns in the studies arise out of fears of the bankruptcy of one broker 
that leads to bankruptcy of another broker-dealer counterparty because there has not been 
simultaneous delivery versus payment between the two in a major financial transaction. 
The evidence from DBL Group’s bankruptcy is unsupportive of the notion that problems in 
perfecting security interests in securities present a serious danger to America’s financial markets.  
Richard C. Breeden, SEC Chairman at the time of the bankruptcy, gave a detailed report on the 
bankruptcy to a Senate committee.  In Mr. Breeden’s account, the reluctance of banks to make a 
secured loan to DBL Group was due to standard commercial considerations. 
Supporters of Proposed Article 8 also often cite to the congressional reports on the Market Reform 
Act of 1990, adopted in part in response to the October 1987 crash, as evidence that the problem 
of potential and actual nonuniformity among the states  [is] the major problem with the commercial 
law foundation of the securities clearance and settlement system. 
The main legal problem actually identified in these reports was an inconsistency in state treatment 
of options as collateral, which does make the financing process more burdensome for prospective 
lenders and may create enough uncertainty to cause a prospective lender to reconsider its decision 
to accept options as collateral for loans. 
Of course, the lack of an overarching justification for Proposed Article 8 does not mean that it 
should be rejected, merely that the case in its favor is weaker than its proponents would like it to 
be.  Proposed Article 8 would make a number of major changes in New York law, however, that 
argue for its amendment. 
Definition of Notice 
For directly held securities, Proposed Article 8 substitutes the term protected purchaser for bona 
fide purchaser.  The first change in Proposed Article 8 from the official 1977 version of Article 8 
is in Proposed Article 8’s narrower definition of notice.  1977 Article 8 relies on the general 
definition of notice in Part 1 of the UCC, which defines notice of a fact to cover both when a 
person (a) has actual knowledge of the fact or (b) from all the facts and circumstances known to 
him at the time in question  has reason to know that it exists. 
Proposed Article 8 creates a unique definition of notice when dealing with adverse claims.  A 
reasonable person standard with regard to notice is rejected.  Notice of an adverse claim exists 
only if the transferee has actual knowledge or if the transferee is willfully blind.  In turn, in order 
to find willful blindness, two things must be established. 
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First, the person [must be] aware of facts sufficient to indicate that there is a significant 
probability that the adverse claim exists.  It is not enough that a claim may exist; there must be a 
significant probability of its existence.  Second, the person must deliberately avoid[ ] information 
that would establish the existence of the adverse claim.  Mere negligence, and perhaps even gross 
negligence, would not meet this second prong. 
New York currently has a non-uniform definition of notice of adverse claims, which supporters of 
Proposed Article 8 believe is comparable to the proposed new definition.  In fact, the legal 
significance of this non-uniform addition is unclear. 
There is ample precedent to support the proposition that New York’s definition of notice for Article 
8 purposes is not materially different from that of other states.  This line of cases holds professional 
purchasers to a higher standard of good faith than other purchasers; therefore, with respect to such 
institutions as brokers and banks, New York’s standard of notice does encompass more than actual 
knowledge or willful blindness.  To be fair to the Article 8 Bar Report, there also is ample precedent 
to support its interpretation of New York law. 
This split in the New York case law suggests that there is no legal consensus on the type of notice 
of adverse claims that is appropriate under Article 8.  A justification for the tightening of the notice 
standards in Proposed Article 8 has to be found in policy arguments rather than in reliance upon 
precedent.  Regrettably, neither Professor Rogers nor the Article 8 Bar Report explicitly addresses 
this issue. 
It would not be appropriate to impose higher new standards requiring frequent investigation by 
transferees.  Such standards would impede the free transferability of securities.  But this does not 
necessarily mean that the current standards should be lowered as they are in Proposed Article 8. 
Barriers to Recovery 
Proposed Article 8 uses no term comparable to protected purchaser to describe a protected 
transferee under the indirect holding system.  Rather, it provides that an adverse claim to a financial 
asset may only be asserted against a person if the claimant can prove that certain stringent 
conditions have been met.  This article will refer to purchasers against whom these conditions 
cannot be proved as favored purchasers in order to distinguish them from the defined term 
protected purchasers. 
In addition, a secured creditor of a securities intermediary is in a position analogous to that of a 
favored purchaser when the secured creditor is in control of a financial asset. 
The first substantive change from prior New York law is common to proposed  8-502, 8-503 and 
8-510, all of which deal with favored purchasers.  The claimant alleging that the transfer is 
wrongful now bears the burden of proof.  In contrast, under prior New York law the burden was 
placed on the transferee claiming bona fide purchaser status. 
Beyond shifting the burden of proof on wrongful conduct to the claimant, proposed 8-502, 8-503 
and 8-510 erect other substantial barriers to recovery from a transferee.  Proposed 8-502 and 8-
Legislature Mulls Change of Article 8; Corporate Law 
5 
510 require notice of the particular adverse claim that is asserted in order for a purchaser to lose 
his/her favored status.  In contrast, New York Article 8 requires that a bona fide purchaser be 
without notice of any adverse claim.  Therefore, knowledge of a claim other than the one being 
asserted against the transferee will not count in determining favored purchaser status. 
An even more fundamental barrier to recovery from a transferee under Proposed Article 8 is 
created by the very definition of a securities entitlement.  A securities entitlement is not a property 
interest in a particular financial asset; therefore, it is extremely unlikely that an investor in the 
indirect holding system will ever be able to prove that he/she has any interest in any particular 
financial asset.  This result is explored in the comments to proposed 8-502. 
As comment 2 describes and as comment 3 illustrates in a number of examples, it will normally 
be impossible for anyone to trace the path of any particular security that is cleared and settled in 
the indirect holding system.  Therefore, it will usually be impossible for anyone even to make an 
equitable argument for recovery against a transferee. 
Proposed 8-503 describes the favored purchaser status of purchasers of financial assets in 
comparison to that of acquirers or purchasers of securities entitlements described in proposed 8-
502 and 8-510.  If the barriers to disproving that a transferee is a favored purchaser would be high 
under proposed 8-502, they would be virtually insurmountable under proposed 8-503.  Instead of 
requiring the claimant to prove notice, 8-503 requires the claimant to prove that the purchaser is 
not act[ing] in collusion with the securities intermediary in violating the securities intermediary’s 
obligations under Section 8-504. 
There is no definition of collusion in Proposed Article 8.  Section 1 of the New York State 
Assembly bill adopting Proposed Article 8 attempts to deal with the lack of definition by stating 
that collusion includes not only activities done in concert but also actual knowledge by a party or 
a party’s deliberate closing of its eyes to facts that would provide knowledge.  This is a useful 
attempt to deal with one weakness of Proposed Article 8, but it does not address the most important 
issue - the priority given to control lenders over securities entitlement holders. 
Securities Intermediary 
Proposed 8-503(a) is one of the more radical sections of Proposed Article 8.  It establishes the 
general principle that financial assets held by a securities intermediary are held by the intermediary 
for its entitlement holders to the extent necessary to satisfy such holders and are not property of 
the securities intermediary. 
Proposed 8-511(a) carries out this general principle by providing that if a securities intermediary 
were to have shortfall in a particular financial asset, all claims of entitlement holders who have 
interests in the financial asset would have priority over any claim of a creditor of the securities 
intermediary. 
It is especially important that such a policy choice favoring entitlement holders has been made.  
Under Proposed Article 8, most investors will lose the protection that they had under New York 
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Article 8 of being able to assert an adverse claim against a particular financial asset, as they will 
no longer be able to trace the asset. 
By defining a securities entitlement as a bundle of rights against a securities intermediary rather 
than as a right in any financial asset, Proposed Article 8 would have the effect of increasing the 
exposure of entitlement holders to the risk of insolvency of their securities intermediaries.  This 
insolvency risk arises from the crucial exception that proposed 8-511 makes to the policy choice 
to favor entitlement holders:  Any claim of a creditor of the securities intermediary that has control 
of the financial asset has priority over any claim of an entitlement holder to the financial asset. 
If one confines consideration of this issue purely to the language of New York Article 8 and ignores 
the approach taken by the courts in applying 1977 Article 8, one can argue that Proposed Article 8 
decreases, not increases, an entitlement holder’s exposure to insolvency risk. 
Under New York Article 8, which on this point is identical to 1977 Article 8, most indirectly held 
securities are held as part of a fungible bulk in which the purchaser is the owner of a proportionate 
property interest.  Therefore, tracing and earlier-in-time concepts, which in theory operate 
fortuitously, should determine whether customers or creditors receive priority.  Difficult as such 
exercises were to justify under 1977 Article 8, such exercises would be almost impossible to justify 
under Proposed Article 8 with its explicit rejection of any tracing notions with respect to financial 
assets. 
In light of the risks imposed on entitlement holders by Proposed Article 8’ s approach to priority 
disputes, one would expect that investors might seek to opt out of the indirect holding system.  The 
ability of any investor to opt out of the system, of which proposed 8-511 is part, however, would 
be limited.  An investor could opt out by holding actual paper certificates, rather than holding a 
securities entitlement with a securities intermediary.  For any investor who will be active in the 
marketplace, this option is not practical. 
As of June 7, 1995, settlement of most security trades must be completed within three days of the 
trade.  This short time frame makes it difficult for an investor to get the paper certificate to his/her 
broker in time for settlement.  As the goal of the SEC is one-day settlement by the end of the 
millennium, this practical difficulty will only grow greater.  In addition, many brokers actively 
discourage their customers from obtaining paper certificates. 
Some supporters of Proposed Article 8 have relied upon the continued presence of  other federal 
and state law, regulation, oversight and enforcement [concerning the relationship between 
investors and brokers] and the continued availability of SIPC [insurance] coverage as premises for 
passage of Proposed Article 8.  However, reliance upon regulation in the current national anti-
regulatory mood may well be unwise.  In addition, insurance raises the moral risk issues so familiar 
from the savings and loan crisis. 
Conclusion 
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Insofar as Proposed Article 8 rests on unproved assumptions about systemic risk, the very real 
changes to the bona fide purchaser rules of New York Article 8 should give one pause.  In the direct 
holding system, the protection afforded owners against bad actors has been significantly weakened.  
In the indirect holding system, the protection afforded a beneficial owner against bad actors is 
essentially meaningless. 
The only meaningful protection is the priority established by proposed 8-511(a) for entitlement 
holders.  But a growth of control lending, which may be likely in the immediate future, would 
mean that the protections of this section also would be illusory, at least with respect to control 
creditors. 
One possible solution to protecting investors would be to create a consumer carveout to proposed 
8-511(b).  Such a carveout, as suggested by Professor Margaret Kniffin, would provide that control 
lenders would have priority over entitlement holders except for entitlement holders who are 
consumers.  A consumer would be defined as a natural person who exercises the rights that 
comprise a financial asset for personal, family or household use.  Institutional investors acting on 
their own behalf or on behalf of consumers do not need such protection as they have the clout and 
knowledge to pursue effective contractual protections. 
It remains to the states to balance the competing interests of investors and control creditors in the 
area of securities transfers, an area that is traditionally one of state law. 
